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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the benefits to human health that would occur in the United States (U.S.) 
due to reductions in local air pollutant emissions stemming from a federal policy to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). In order to measure the impacts of reduced emissions of local 
pollutants, this study considers a representative U.S. climate policy. Specifically, the climate 
policy modeled in this analysis is the Warner Lieberman bill (S.2191) of 2008 and the paper 
considers the impacts of reduced emissions in the transport and electric power sectors. This 
analysis provides strong evidence that climate change policy in the U.S. will generate significant 
returns to society in excess of the benefits due to climate stabilization. The total health related 
co benefits associated with a representative climate policy over the years 2006 to 2030 range 
between $90 and $725 billion in present value terms depending on modeling assumptions. The 
majority of avoided damages are due to reduced emissions of SO2 from coal fired power plants. 
Among the most important assumptions is whether remaining coal fired generation capacity is 
permitted to “backslide” up to the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) cap on emissions. This 
analysis models two scenarios specifically related to this issue. Co benefits increase from $90 
billion, when the CAIR cap is met, to $256 billion if SO2 emissions are not permitted to exceed 
current emission rates. On a per ton basis, the co benefit per ton of GHG emissions is projected 
to average between $2 and $14 ($2006). The per ton marginal abatement cost for the 
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1 Introduction 
This study investigates the benefits to human health that would occur in the United States (U.S.) 
due to reductions in local air pollutant emissions stemming from a federal policy to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). The principal GHGs enter the atmosphere through the 
burning of fossil fuels; hence, achieving emission reductions depends on burning less fossil fuels 
or using less carbon intensive fossil fuels. Such policies, in turn, may lead to significant 
reductions in local air pollutants such as particulate matter (PM), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) since these pollutants are also produced when fossil fuels are burned. 
 
In order to measure the impacts of reduced emissions of local pollutants, this study considers a 
representative U.S. climate policy. Specifically, the climate policy modeled in this analysis is the 
Warner Lieberman bill (S.2191). This bill is broadly similar in terms of its stringency and the 
timing of emission reductions to many of the proposed climate bills that have been considered by 
the U.S. Congress.  This paper estimates the effect such a policy would have on the emissions of 
six major pollutants (coarse particulate matter (PM10), fine particulate matter (PM2.5), volatile 
organic compounds (VOC), NOx, ammonia (NH3), and SO2) in the transport and electric power 
sectors. This is accomplished through the use of a production cost model for the electric power 
generation sector, and by employing fuel price demand elasticities for the transportation sector. 
 
The paper focuses on emissions from electric power generation and transportation because 
together these sources account for nearly two thirds of GHG emissions in the U.S. The 
remaining GHG emissions in the U.S. are produced by the following sources; industry  
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contributes 19%, and agricultural, residential and commercial sources together account for 
another 18%
1.   
 
In order to estimate the benefits of reduced emissions of these local pollutants, this analysis 
employs an integrated assessment model. Specifically, emissions are connected to changes in 
concentrations, human exposures, physical effects and monetary damages by the Air Pollution 
Emission Experiments and Policy model (APEEP, see Muller, Mendelsohn 2007).  The co 
benefits associated with reduced emissions of local air pollutants reflect the difference in 
damages corresponding to a baseline, or business as usual (BAU) scenario between 2006 and 
2030 and the emissions of these pollutants over the same time period under the representative 
U.S. climate policy.  These reduced human health damages are considered the ancillary benefits 
of the climate policy aimed at the reduction of GHGs. 
 
Whilst damages from air pollution emissions are diverse, ranging from adverse effects on human 
health, reduced yields of agricultural crops and timber, reductions in visibility, enhanced 
depreciation of man made materials, to damages due to lost recreation services, this paper 
focuses solely on the benefits to human health resulting from such reductions. This focus 
recognizes that research in this area has repeatedly shown that the vast majority of damages from 
such air pollutants occur to human health (Burtraw et al., 1998; USEPA, 1999; Muller and 
Mendelsohn, 2007). 
An important question regarding climate policy is the treatment of aggregate levels of local air 
pollutants that are currently managed under incentive based policies
2.  Since such policies lack 
                                                 
1 Shares calculated on 2007 GHG emissions as found in table ES 7, p.ES 14 of 2009 U.S. Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory Report.   
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direct controls on individual unit level emissions, the behavior of regulated sources under both 
climate and local pollutant programs is uncertain. As a result of this, we explore alternative 
scenarios regarding the emission levels of such sources. By capping GHG emissions, and 
therefore pricing carbon, climate policy is likely to generate structural changes to both the 
transportation and electric power generation sectors
3. Specifically, the incentives created by 
policies that increase the cost of burning carbon rich fuels will push firms to employ less carbon 
intensive fuels. For electric power generation, climate policy is anticipated to induce a shift away 
from coal fired power towards natural gas, nuclear, and renewables. As these structural changes 
take root, some coal plants will likely shut down in response to the costs of compliance with 
climate policy. As coal fired capacity atrophies, SO2 emissions in particular will decline. As a 
result, the aggregate cap on SO2 emissions, associated with the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), 
is quite likely to become non binding for remaining coal fired capacity. And given the inherent 
flexibility in cap and trade programs that govern SO2 emissions, remaining facilities, in hopes of 
reducing their compliance costs, will have the ability to increase SO2 emissions per kilowatt 
hour. Examples of this cost minimizing behavior may include disengaging scrubbers or returning 
to high sulfur coal inputs.  
 
The central point is that absent some additional constraint on SO2 emissions, the remaining coal 
fired capacity is likely to relax their controls on SO2 emissions in an effort to reduce costs. In 
order to emulate this outcome, we model a policy scenario in which SO2 emissions are permitted 
to remain at the aggregate cap in place under CAIR. Although coal fired power plants may face 
constraints on how much they can lower costs (and how much they can increase their SO2 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 These include SO2 and NOx. 
3 The composition and input choices in the manufacturing sector will also likely change due to federal climate 
policy. However, the focus of this study is on the electric power and transportation sectors.  
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emissions), this modeling approach provides a lower bound on ancillary benefits by pursuing a 
maximum SO2 emission level from the electric power generation sector. 
 
This analysis provides strong evidence that climate change policy in the U.S. will generate 
significant returns to society in addition to the benefits due to climate stabilization. The total 
health related co benefits associated with a representative climate policy over the years 2006 to 
2030 range between $90 and $725 billion in present value terms depending on modeling 
assumptions. These co benefits are due to improvements in health status associated with 
projected emissions reductions of SO2, PM2.5, PM10, NOx, NH3, and VOC.   Although reduced 
emissions of each of these local pollutants yield benefits, the majority of avoided damages are 
due to reduced emissions of SO2 from coal fired power plants. This is due to the projected 
replacement of coal fired generation capacity with natural gas and, to a lesser extent, renewables. 
The importance of benefits due to SO2 abatement from coal fired power plants is evidenced in 
the scenario that permits SO2 emissions from such facilities to increase back to the CAIR cap. 
Relative to the policy scenario with default assumptions, when SO2 emissions form the electric 
power generators regulated under CAIR are permitted to backslide up to the extant CAIR cap, 
co benefits decrease by $167 billion in present value terms to approximately $90 billion. This 
result suggests that a climate policy that does not address the issue of SO2 emissions 
management under CAIR is likely to forego substantial health related co benefits. On a per ton 
basis, we find that these co benefits are 20 to 150 percent of the expected per ton abatement cost 
associated with the representative climate policy. Specifically, the estimated marginal co benefits 
are between $2 and $14 per ton of CO2e. The marginal abatement cost for CO2 has been 
estimated to be $9 per ton (USEPA, 2008).   
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2 Policy Background 
The U.S.’ federal GHG policy approach of the past 10 years has relied primarily on voluntary 
programs for energy conservation (e.g. the ‘Energy Star’
4 Program), research and development 
promotion via expenditure and tax incentives, and standards (e.g. the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007).  In addition, there have been many State and regional policy responses to 
global warming. These include the Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32), California’s Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 2006, which set a binding goal for GHG reductions by 2020.  On the regional 
scale, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) governs CO2 emissions for the electric 
power generation sector in ten Northeastern and Mid Atlantic States using a cap and trade 
instrument. RGGI is the first mandatory, market based CO2 emissions reduction program in the 
U.S. In total, over 30 states have approved a variety of laws dealing with global warming. 
In the federal policy arena, cap and trade is the policy mechanism that has gained the most 
momentum with a large number of legislative proposals calling for a federal cap and trade 
system since 2003. Specifically, there were seven federal cap and trade proposals introduced in 
2007. These included: Bingaman Specter’s Low Carbon Economy Act (S. 1766), the Lieberman 
McCain Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act (S. 280), the Kerry Snow Global Warming 
Reduction Act (S. 485) , the Waxman Safe Climate Act (HR 1590),  the Sanders Boxer Global 
Warming Pollution Reduction Act (S. 309) ,  the Feinstein Carper Electric Utility Cap and Trade 
Act (S. 317), the Alexander Lieberman Clean Air/Climate Change Act (S. 1168), and the 
Lieberman –Warner America's Climate Security Act (S.2191). 
 
                                                 
4 ENERGY STAR is a joint program of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of 
Energy for the promotion of energy efficient products and practices (see http://www.energystar.gov/).  
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Although there are important differences among these federal cap and trade proposals, there are 
strong similarities in the emission reduction targets and the timing of the emission reductions 
among these bills (see figures D1 and D2 in Appendix D). The scenario analyzed in this paper is 
that projected to occur given the enactment of S.2191. Although the analysis is specific to 
S.2191, this scenario is a representative U.S. climate policy in terms of both emission reduction 
targets and the timing of such reductions (see Appendix D).  An additional advantage of using 
S.2191 as the representative policy is that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) 
provides corresponding carbon allowance prices, sectoral abatement and other projections which 
are useful in carrying out the empirical analysis in the current paper. Specifically, in March 2008, 
the USEPA released its macroeconomic analysis of the Lieberman Warner bill from 2012 to 
2050 (USEPA, 2008). The modeling apparatus in the USEPA’s study draws on the results from 
two economic models: the ADAGE model and the IGEM model
5 . The USEPA study is an 




In this analysis we use the results from the ADAGE Core Scenario 2 which models the bill as 
written.  The reason for using the results from ADAGE is that the allowance prices estimated by 
this model are towards the center of the range of allowance prices reported by IGEM and a 
recent USEPA analysis of the bill currently under discussion in Congress (ACES HR2454). The 
range of permit prices is shown in table C1 (Appendix C). 
                                                 
5 Both are dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) models The ADAGE model was developed at Research 
Triangle Institute (RTI) in North Carolina (see www.rti.org/adage).  IGEM was developed at Harvard University  
(http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/files/IGEM%20Documentation.pdf). 
6 The EPA analysis is available online at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/s2191_EPA_Analysis.pdf;  
the complete results are available at http://www.epa.gov/climate change/downloads/DataAnnex S.2191.zip. 
  
  8 
3      Emission Modeling  
The analysis of ancillary benefits due to climate policy effectively compares emissions of SO2, 
PM2.5, PM10, NOx, NH3, and VOC under two different scenarios. The first scenario projects local 
pollutant emissions that reflect BAU assumptions regarding demand growth between 2006 and 
2030 given current environmental policies, transportation fuel prices, and electricity prices. The 
second scenario reflects emissions of local pollutants given the enactment of a federal climate 
policy over the same time period as the BAU scenario. The analysis models changes in emissions 
in both the electric power generation sector and the transportation sector. Emissions from other 
sectors are held fixed. The APEEP model accepts emission inputs associated with each of these 
two scenarios, and it estimates exposures, premature mortalities, increased rates of illness, and 
monetary damage associated with both scenarios. The ancillary benefits reported in section 4 
reflect the difference in damages due to emissions of SO2, PM2.5, PM10, NOx, NH3, and VOC 
between the BAU and the policy scenarios. 
3.1 Modeling emissions from electricity production. 
In order to model changes in emissions from the electric power sector, we employ the EDF 
Regional Electricity Model (EDF REM), a production cost model. The EDF REM is designed to 
mimic the results of the USEPA Integrated Planning Model (IPM) while providing the detailed 
results for individual plants needed as inputs to the APEEP model.  IPM "is a multi regional, 
dynamic, deterministic, linear programming model of the electric power sector".
7  The EDF 
REM is used to account for economical energy production and to evaluate production savings 
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from investment in generating technologies.  While these modeling techniques are different, they 
are both standard and compatible methods commonly used in the utility industry for forecasting 
and planning.  In this instance, the EDF REM production cost model takes the CO2 price forecast 
from IPM as an input and determines the most economical way to meet electric demand given 
those CO2 prices.   
 
For consistency, the EDF REM also uses the same inputs as the USEPA IPM where practicable.  
For instance, fuel price forecasts for both the BAU and policy case are the same in both models, 
as are build limits for new technologies such as nuclear and renewable plants.  Similar to IPM, 
the EDF REM uses the USEPA's National Electric Energy Data System (NEEDS database) for 
information on power plant locations and operational characteristics such as capacity, fuel type 
and heat rate.  To ensure further consistency, the EDF REM is benchmarked to the IPM's CO2 
emissions forecast under both the BAU and policy scenarios. 
 
This application of the EDF REM consists of two model runs; a BAU case and a policy case 
representing the S.2191. Emission reductions are calculated by comparing projected emissions 
given the two model runs.  The BAU case is benchmarked to USEPA's reference case
8 and the 
policy case is benchmarked to the ADAGE Core Scenario 2 results for electric generation, CO2 
emissions, fuel prices, allowance prices, and new capacity additions. (Both the reference case 
and ADAGE Core Scenario 2 employ IPM.)  It is important to note that the BAU case includes 
                                                 
8 This scenario served as the benchmark case to which the various ADAGE model runs were compared.  
  10 
emissions reductions associated with CAIR
9. Further, the policy case assumes that the CAIR 
emission caps remain in effect.  
 
As mentioned above, the REM provides spatially detailed modeling results for all electricity 
generating sources in the contiguous U.S. greater than 25 MW in size. These generating units 
comprise over 9,500 point sources.  Annual emission data for these 9,500 point sources are 
matched to APEEP according to source location and source specifications.  
3.2 Modeling emissions from transportation.  
 
The transportation BAU emission projections are based on USEPA’s emission inventory for the 
period 2002   2030 (Air Quality & Modeling Center Assessment & Standards Division   U.S. 
EPA Office of Transportation & Air Quality)
10.  The on road emissions are based on the 
National Mobile Inventory Model (NMIM) using MOBILE6
11 emission factors.  The USEPA 
emissions projections account for all finalized USEPA regulations and include the Renewable 
Fuel Standard (RFS1).  Some emission source projections  (such as aircraft) are based on the 
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency’s emission forecast (USDOE, 2007
12) 
and thus do not take into account any changes which may have occurred due to regulations 
                                                 
9 The Clean Air Interstate Rule proposes a reduction in SO2 and NOx emissions in 28 Eastern states and the district 
of Columbia.  Under CAIR, SO2 emissions would be reduced by 70 percent and NOx emissions reduced by 60 
percent in the CAIR region.  The CAIR is currently under litigation.  See http://www.epa.gov/cair/ for more 
information.  
10 These data are derived from the public version of USEPA's emission inventory for 2002  2030 as provided by 
the USEPA, Office of Transportation and Air Quality. 
11 The National Mobile Inventory Model (NMIM) is a computer application developed by EPA to help develop 
estimates of current and future emission inventories for on road motor vehicles and non road equipment.  NMIM 
uses current versions of MOBILE6 and NONROAD to calculate emission inventories, based on multiple input 
scenarios that are entered into the system. NMIM can be used to calculate national, individual state or county 
inventories. Vehicle Emission Modeling Software and related presentations and training resources.  MOBILE6 is an 
emission factor model for predicting gram per mile emissions of Hydrocarbons (HC), Carbon Monoxide (CO), 
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Particulate Matter (PM), and toxics from cars, trucks, and 
motorcycles under various conditions. NONROAD is used for estimation of air pollution emission  inventories. 
12  More specifically EIA’s AEO2007.  
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which came into force after 2007 (for example, the Energy Independence and Security Act  of 
2007).  
 
The policy scenario for transport emissions of GHGs is dictated by the aggregate GHG emission 
cap. In this study, the effect of the GHG cap on transportation emissions is modeled through the 
price effects on fuels, the resulting change in consumption of transportation fuels, and 
corresponding change to emissions. We rely on USEPA’s estimates of fuel price increases from 
2012 through 2050
13 . The expected price increases of fuels from the climate policy are shown in 
Table C2 (Appendix C). Peer reviewed demand elasticities are used to estimate the reduced use 
of fuels that would result given the price increases projected to occur as a result of climate 
policy. Table C3 shows estimates of the long run gasoline price elasticity. Other transportation 
modes employ different fuels. For diesel, compressed natural gas (CNG) and other transport 
fuels we rely on the price elasticities shown in Table C4.  
 
It is important to note that this approach produces projections which model the influence of the 
climate policy on demand for existing fuels based on past evidence of price impacts.  However, it 
does not include a potential shift to fuels with much lower carbon content.   
 
 
4  Modeling Air Pollution Damages 
                                                 
13 The EPA analysis is available online at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/s2191_EPA_Analysis.pdf;  
the complete results are available at http://www.epa.gov/climate change/downloads/DataAnnex S.2191.zip. 
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This study uses the APEEP model (Muller, Mendelsohn, 2007), which is calibrated to simulate 
the consequences of both the BAU and policy scenarios. In terms of its structure, APEEP is a 
traditional integrated assessment model in that it resembles integrated assessment models used 
by USEPA and other researchers to measure the impacts of air pollution (Mendelsohn, 1980; 
Nordhaus, 1992; USEPA, 1999).  Specifically, the model begins with emissions and then it uses 
an air quality model to determine where emissions travel to and the degree to which they react 
with other pollutants in the atmosphere. Next APEEP computes exposures of people to ambient 
air pollution. Finally, APEEP determines the resulting human health impacts and the monetary 
value of such impacts. The following sections describe the key components of the APEEP model 
in more detail. 
 
The emission sources modeled in APEEP are grouped into four broad categories. First are the 
ground level emissions which include mobile sources and stationary sources without a tall 
smokestack. These are further subdivided according to vehicle type, fuel type, and for stationary 
sources, the different categories that the USEPA identifies in its national emission inventory: 
agriculture, forestry, and mining, for example. APEEP also models point sources with three 
distinct effective heights
14; low stack sources (effective height less than 250 meters): including 
most manufacturing facilities; medium stack sources (effective height between 250 and 500 
meters); and tall stack sources (with an effective height of greater than 500 meters). The four 
source categories listed above encompass all of the emissions of the six pollutants modeled by 
APEEP in the contiguous U.S. as reported by the USEPA (USEPA, 2006). Emissions from each 
of the first three categories are aggregated, by pollutant, to the county level. Emissions from the 
tall stack sources are modeled at the facility level. 
                                                 
14 Effective height is defined as stack height plus eventual plume rise.  
  13 
 
The spatial detail in APEEP’s documentation of sources is important because, unlike the effects 
of greenhouse gas emissions which are independent of source location, the health effects of the 
air pollutants modeled in APEEP are relatively localized.  Following the documentation of 
emissions, APEEP uses an air quality model to predict seasonal and annual average county 
concentrations for PM2.5, PM10, VOC, NOx, SO2, NH3 and tropospheric ozone (O3). The air 
quality model simulates transport, chemical transformation into other pollutants, and deposition 
of each emitted species. This model is discussed in Muller, Mendelsohn (2007). Note that 
APEEP takes atmospheric chemistry into account.  This is important because, following 
emission, some of the pollutants tracked by the model transform in the atmosphere into more 
harmful pollutants; for example, SO2 emissions become particulate sulfate and NOx emissions 
contribute to concentrations of both particulate nitrate and O3.  The damages from these 
secondary pollutants are attributed to the sources that produced the emission. 
 
APEEP then calculates human exposures to the predicted concentrations by multiplying county 
level pollution concentrations by the county level population data. Current population levels are 
provided by the U.S. Department of the Census while future population projections are provided 
by the Center for Disease Control. In the APEEP model, populations are differentiated by age 
because the health impacts of local air pollution are proportional to baseline incidence rates 
which are age dependent. 
 
APEEP translates exposures into physical effects using concentration response functions 
published in peer reviewed studies in the epidemiological literature.  The full list of  
  14 
concentration response functions used in APEEP is found in Muller and Mendelsohn (2007). 
Because premature mortalities account for the majority of damages due to exposures to the local 
air pollution, we focus here on the concentration response functions that govern the relationship 
between the annual mean level of PM2.5 and adult mortality rates, infant mortality rates, as well 
as the relationship between exposures to O3 and all age mortality rates. To model the relationship 
between PM2.5 exposures and adult mortality rates APEEP employs the results from Pope et al., 
(2002). The relationship between infant mortality rates and exposure to PM2.5 is captured using 
the findings in Woodruff et al., (2006). Finally, the results from Bell et al. (2004) govern the 
impact of O3 exposure on mortality rates of all ages.  APEEP also measures the damages due to 
chronic illnesses such as chronic bronchitis and asthma in addition to mortality (Abbey et al. 
1999; McDonnell, 1999).   
     
APEEP expresses the value of the physical effects resulting from exposures to air pollution in 
dollar terms
15. Applying monetary values to effects on human health, especially premature 
mortalities is methodologically difficult and politically controversial. The published literature 
relies upon two approaches to value premature mortality risks: revealed preference and stated 
preference methods (Cropper, Oates, 1992; Viscusi, Aldy, 2003). For mortality valuation, 
APEEP uses the results from a meta analysis that encompasses both the revealed preference 
literature that uses hedonic wage models to estimate the relationship between wages and 
occupation specific mortality rates and the stated preference literature which asks people what 
they would be willing to pay to avoid mortality risks on surveys (USEPA, 1999). The literature 
notes that dividing the risk premium (R), which reflects how much workers require in extra pay 
                                                 
15 Note that all values are expressed in constant year 2006 U.S. dollars.  
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in order to assume an additional, incremental risk of death, by the change in the probability of 
death ( γ) yields the value of a statistical life (VSL) , (Viscusi, Aldy, 2003). 
 
  VSL=(R/ γ)              (1) 
     
One complication in the application of VSLs is whether this parameter should be applied 
uniformly to people of all ages or whether the VSL should be differentiated by age. This is 
important because the estimates of VSL are derived from studies that focus on working age 
people but most of the mortalities from air pollution affect the elderly and the very young. This 
study adopts the approach employed by the USEPA and other federal agencies which apply the 
VSL uniformly to populations of all ages (USEPA, 1999). 
 
In addition to the baseline scenario, scenario 1, which employs the modeling assumptions for 
human health impact described above, we conduct a sensitivity analysis in order to test the 
importance of specific assumptions in the model to the benefit estimates for emission reductions. 
In the first alternative scenario, scenario 2, we employ an alternative concentration response 
function relating long term PM2.5 exposures to adult mortality rates using the results from Laden 
et al., (2006). In scenario 3, we employ the modeling assumptions of scenario 1, however, SO2 
emissions from coal fired power plants are permitted to reach the CAIR cap. Since the CAIR cap 
is the emission limit in our BAU scenario, scenario 3 sets SO2 emissions to their levels in the 
BAU. There are no co benefits from SO2 in the electric power generation sector under scenario 
3.  
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Because the study extends far into the future we must project how personal income will change 
over the life of the policy (until 2030). We employ the rate of income growth used in the 
ADAGE model (3.0% annual growth). Further, we use the USEPA’s reported value for the 
elasticity between income and willingness to pay to avoid mortality risk: 0.5. This is employed to 
adjust the VSL in future years. Finally, APEEP discounts all future benefits to their present value 
at a 5% discount rate. We employ discount rates of 3% and 2% in order to test the impact of the 
discount rate on the co benefit estimates.  
 
The health damages reported in this analysis are described in equations (2) through (4). The 
damages (premature mortality plus morbidity) in time period (t) under the policy scenario is 





 t        (2) 
where : Popi,t,r = population of age group (i), at time (t), in county (r). 
                γi,t,r,k   = incidence rate of health state (k), at time (t), for age group (i), in county (r). 
                βs,k      = dose response parameter for health state (k), for pollutant (s). 
             C
BAU
s,t,r   = BAU ambient concentration of pollutant species (s), at time (t), in county (r). 
               αt,k     = valuation parameter at time (t) for health state (k) = VSL. 









s,t,r   = with policy ambient concentration of pollutant species (s), at time (t), in county (r). 
 
The co benefits of climate policy in any one time period (t) is the difference in damages between 
the policy (Dpol) and the BAU (DBAU) scenarios. The total benefits are the discounted sum of the 
difference between BAU and policy damages over (t) as shown in (4).  
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D = ∑t(DBAU(t) – Dpol(t))                  (4) 
 
As this study has focused solely on the health benefits it is a de facto underestimate of the actual 
total ancillary benefits.  Some examples of the benefits this study does not capture include: 
reduced yields of agricultural crops and timber due to tropospheric ozone (O3), reductions in 
visibility from reduced emission of fine particles (PM10,  PM2 and SO2),  enhanced depreciation 
of man made materials (buildings and historical monuments) from acid rain contributed to by 
emission of NOx and SO2;  and damages due to lost recreation services (deterioration of water 
quality in recreational fishing areas). Muller and Mendelsohn (2007) found that human health 
impacts accounted for over 90% of the total damages from the local air pollutants modeled in 
APEEP. 
5  Results 
Table 1 displays both the estimated premature mortalities using the default assumptions in the 
APEEP model as well as the annual co benefits of climate policy from 2006 until 2030 for each 
of the three modeling scenarios. Since climate policy begins with modest reductions in GHGs, 
the emission reductions of local pollutants are also relatively small in the early years of this 
analysis. As a result, both the co benefits and the projected avoided mortalities begin low and 
increase as the climate policy becomes more stringent. The right hand column in Table 1 
indicates the premature mortalities avoided begin at 1 case in 2006 and then increase to greater 
than 200 in 2011. The number of avoided deaths continues to grow to just less than 5,000 in 
2020 and finally rises to over 7,000 avoided deaths in 2030.  
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Table 1 also reports the aggregate ancillary benefits of the GHG abatement policy in present 
value terms (discounted at 5%). The results are broken down by year in order to show the 
relative magnitudes of the benefits generated over the 25 year time period covered in this paper. 
The first column (second from the left) corresponds to modeling scenario 1, which uses the dose 
response function relating adult mortality rates to exposures to PM2.5 derived from Pope et al., 
(2002), personal income growth of 3%, and the elasticity between willingness to pay to avoid 
mortality risks and income of 0.5.  
 
The first pattern of note is that the estimated co benefits generally increase from the first year of 
the policy through 2026. This occurs for three reasons. First, greater amounts of GHGs are 
abated (as the aggregate cap on emissions becomes tighter). This implies that increasing amounts 
of local pollutants are abated as well. Second, populations are projected to grow between 2006 
and 2030; as a result the population potentially exposed to local air pollutants increases as well. 
Hence, for a given reduction in emissions, the health related benefits of such reductions will 
increase with greater populations. These first two factors are reflected in the increasing number 
of avoided mortalities reported in Table 1. That is, greater reductions in harmful emissions and 
larger exposed populations translates into more avoided deaths. The final factor that has an 
influence on the increasing co benefits through time is the following; as income grows, the value 
attributed to avoided mortality risk becomes larger, too. Therefore, each avoided mortality is 
attributed a larger value because the willingness to pay to avoid mortality risks is an increasing 
function of personal income. 
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With the scenario 1, benefits begin at $4 million in 2006, and increase to $16.2 billion in 2026. 
Thereafter, benefits decline to $16.1 billion in 2030. Benefits decline in the distant future 
because of discounting. Hence, although the projected number of avoided mortalities grows 
steadily from 2006 through 2030, the co benefits begin to decline in 2027 due to discounting.  
 
The total benefit of climate change policy in the default case is $256 billion, in present value 
terms. For modeling scenarios 2 and 3 the pattern in benefits accrued through 2030 is quite 
similar to the default case; benefits begin at modest levels and then they increase through 2026 
and then begin to decline in 2027 through 2030. However, the magnitude of the co benefits are 
considerably larger in the second scenario. Recall that scenario 2 employs an alternative dose 
response function corresponding to the adult mortality PM2.5 relationship (Laden, et al., 2006). In 
particular, the dose response parameter reported in the Laden et al. (2006) study is nearly three 
times larger than the parameter reported in the Pope et al. (2002) study. Total co benefits in 
scenario 2 are $725 billion. Scenario 3 reflects the SO2 emissions from coal fired power 
generators increasing up to the CAIR cap. Since the CAIR cap is met in the BAU scenario, 
effectively SO2 benefits from power production are equal to zero in this case. As a result, total 
co benefits are considerably smaller than in scenarios 1 and 2. Total co benefits for scenario 3 
are equal to $90 billion in present value terms. 
 
Table 2 tests the impact of the discount rate on the magnitude of the co benefits. In addition to 
the default discount rate of 5%, table 2 reports co benefits using 3% and 2%. With the discount 
rate set to 3%, total co benefits increase to $364 billion; recall that co benefits total $256 billion 
with a discount rate of 5%. With the discount rate set to 2%, co benefits increase to $437 billion.  
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Note that the only parameter that has changed (with respect to modeling scenario 1) is the 
discount rate. Hence, table 2 indicates that the magnitude of the co benefits is sensitive to the 
choice of the discount rate. 
 
Table 3 provides an alternative perspective on the co benefits of climate change policy. This 
table expresses the co benefits per ton of GHG (CO2e) abated for each year in the analysis. In 
scenario 1, benefits per ton of GHG begin at $0.60 in 2006, and then increase to around $6 
between 2014 and 2019. Thereafter, per ton benefits decline to $3.30 in 2030. The inter temporal 
average co benefit/ton CO2e for scenario 1 is $4.2. The results shown in this table are especially 
powerful when viewed in conjunction with recent estimates of the marginal abatement costs for 
GHGs. Specifically, USEPA finds that the inter temporal average present value marginal 
abatement costs are projected to be $9/ton CO2e (USEPA, 2008).  
 
As with Table 1, the inter temporal pattern in benefits per ton of abatement are similar across the 
three scenarios while the magnitudes are quite different for scenarios 2 and 3. That is, the 
benefits per ton of GHG are nearly three times larger when using scenario 2. Notably, benefits 
per ton increase to $17/ton CO2e between 2014 and 2019. For scenario 3, the per ton co benefits 
follow a similar pattern through 2030, and the average is $1.5. 
 
Another interesting pattern is evident in Table 3. Benefits per ton of GHG increase from 2006 
until 2010, then per ton benefits decline in 2011 and 2012 and begin to increase again in 2013. 
This occurs because the emission reductions in the transportation sector begin in 2011, since the 
quantity of GHGs abated increases significantly the benefit per ton of CO2e decreases.  
  21 
 
Figure 1 provides a comparison of the present value of marginal co benefits per ton CO2e with 
the marginal abatement costs. The figure includes the marginal co benefits estimated with 
APEEP modeling scenario 1, 2, and 3. With scenario 1, marginal co benefits average $4.8 per 
ton CO2e over the period from 2012 – 2030. Under modeling scenario 2, the average co benefit 
is nearly $14 per ton CO2e. Finally, for scenario 3, the average co benefit per ton CO2e is $1.7. 
Over the same time period, marginal abatement costs average $9. This implies that the estimated 
marginal co benefit for abatement of GHG is comparable to the marginal abatement cost without 
including direct benefits of climate stabilization. Because the co benefits reported in this paper 
nearly balance the costs of abatement at the margin, the argument for aggressive abatement of 
GHGs is significantly strengthened. 
 
Table 4 displays the co benefits per ton CO2e abated for the three discount rates. Like table 2, 
this table employs 2%, 3%, and 5%. With the discount rate set to 3%, the average co benefit per 
ton CO2e is $5.6 over the entire 25 year period. Employing a discount rate of 2% increases the 
co benefit per ton CO2e to $6.5. The trajectory of the co benefits per ton CO2e through 2030 is 
not sensitive to the discount rate. Figure 2 displays the co benefits per ton CO2e as a function of 
the discount rate between 2012 and 2030.  
 
Figure 3 displays the spatial distribution of benefits from climate change policy in the year 2020. 
In general, the aggregate benefits occur in states with large populations. New York, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and Texas all are projected to incur co benefits of greater than $750 
million in the year 2020. It is interesting to note that California, which has the largest state  
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population, is not in the highest benefit category. This is the case for two reasons. First, with 
prevailing winds from the west, California does not have any emission sources of local pollutants 
directly upwind. Second, much of California’s energy is produced with natural gas and much of 
the aggregate co benefits in other states are due to the reduced use of coal in energy production.  
 
Figure 4 displays the per capita co benefits by state. The spatial pattern in Figure 2 is striking; all 
of the states that are projected to experience the largest per capita co benefits of climate change 
policy are located east of the Mississippi River. These include: Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, and North Carolina. This figure emphasizes the 
importance of coal to the overall co benefits analysis. That is, much of the total co benefits 
estimated to occur as a result of this climate change policy stem from a reduction in the amount 
of coal burned to produce electricity. Since, most of the coal fired electric power generation 
capacity is located in the Southeast and the Midwest, the benefits due to burning less coal will 
accrue in areas proximal to these generators and areas downwind (to the east).  
 
Table 5 provides a detailed decomposition of the total co benefits by pollutant and by sector. 
First, Table 5 indicates that of the $256 billion total co benefits that are projected to occur (under 
the default modeling scenario) $207 billion are a result of emission reductions in the electric 
power generation sector. This implies that $50 billion worth of the co benefits stem from 
abatement in the transportation sector. With the electric power generation sector, SO2 reductions 
account for the largest share of benefits: $167 billion of the $207 total. This is due to burning 
less coal in order to generate electricity. This result reinforces the pattern evident in figure 3; 
most of the co benefits occur in the eastern U.S. where coal is the predominant fuel used to  
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generate power. The next largest share of benefits within the power generation sector is due to 
abatement of NOx; benefits attributable to NOx abatement are worth $21.2 billion. Finally, 
abatement of fine particulate matter (PM2.5) generates benefits of $18 billion. Within the 
transportation sector, reduced emissions of NOx yield benefits of nearly $14 billion. Abatement 
of VOC and NH3 produce benefits of $15 billion and $8.5 billion, respectively. Reduced 
emissions of PM2.5 correspond to benefits of nearly $8 billion.  
6  Conclusions 
 
This analysis provides strong evidence that climate change policy in the U.S. will generate 
significant returns to society in addition to the returns due to climate stabilization. Aside from the 
benefits stemming directly from reduced GHG emissions, the health related co benefits 
associated with a representative climate policy range between $90 and $725 billion, in present 
value terms, depending on modeling assumptions. These co benefits are due to improvements in 
health status associated with projected emissions reductions of SO2, PM2.5, PM10, NOx, NH3, and 
VOC.   Since the co benefits estimated in this paper do not account for the manufacturing sector, 
the co benefits stemming from federal climate policy in the U.S. are likely to be larger than what 
is reported herein. 
 
The analysis finds that the co benefits of climate change policy are not uniformly distributed 
across the U.S. Total co benefits are clustered in the states with the largest populations. This is 
intuitive given that the benefits modeled in this study concentrate on human health impacts.  
However, in per capita terms the co benefits display a far more interesting pattern. Specifically, 
the states that are projected to enjoy the greatest per capita co benefits are all east of the  
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Mississippi River. The reason for this striking spatial pattern is that the majority of the co 
benefits are projected to be due to reduced reliance on coal in electric power generation. Much of 
the existing generation capacity located in the Midwestern and eastern U.S. uses coal. As climate 
change policy creates incentives to move away from coal towards natural gas and renewables, 
the health related benefits of this shift are likely to occur in states nearby and downwind of the 
large existing coal fired power plants. In fact, nearly two thirds of the total projected co benefits 
stem from reduced SO2 emissions from electric power generators. Much of this SO2 abatement is 
a result of moving away from the use of coal to generate electric power. 
 
On a per ton GHG basis, these co benefits over the time period 2012   2030 are estimated to 
average between $1.7 and $14. USEPA estimates for total abatement costs permit an estimation 
of
16 the marginal abatement cost for a ton of CO2e. Over the period 2012 to 2030, the marginal 
abatement costs are predicted to average $9. This implies that the estimated marginal co benefit 
for abatement of GHG is worth between 20 and 150 percent of the marginal abatement cost 
without including direct benefits of climate stabilization. Because the co benefits reported in this 
paper nearly balance the costs of abatement at the margin, this analysis strengthens the argument 





                                                 
16See slide 74 of the, EPA Analysis of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 2191 in 110th 
Congress, March 14, 2008. The abatement from the electricity sector for the Adage scenario 2 model run was 
provided to us by the RTI modeling group.  The abatement from the transport sector was estimated to be 
proportional to the forecast reductions in petroleum use for this same model run  
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Table 1 : Avoided Mortalities and Total Co-Benefits of Climate Policy ($2006, million)  
 
Year  Total co-benefits, PV under three scenarios 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Avoided           
Mortalities 
Scenario 1. 
2006  4  12  3  1 
2007  63  179  9  10 
2008  117  334  15  20 
2009  172  541  14  40 
2010  262  743  49  50 
2011  1,141  3,225  197  230 
2012  1,951  5,522  332  420 
2013  5,895  16,576  2,561  1350 
2014  8,988  24,043  4,038  2020 
2015  10,252  28,586  4,268  2530 
2016  11,465  32,568  4,532  2950 
2017  12,979  36,488  4,889  3470 
2018  14,209  39,993  5,059  3970 
2019  14,955  41,562  5,377  4280 
2020  15,428  43,755  5,466  4580 
2021  15,465  43,819  5,457  4770 
2022  15,319  43,686  5,283  5000 
2023  15,546  44,231  5,274  5270 
2024  15,692  44,631  5,214  5540 
2025  15,890  45,187  5,178  5830 
2026  16,205  46,331  5,291  6160 
2027  16,161  46,178  5,326  6370 
2028  16,011  45,623  5,263  6580 
2029  16,172  45,870  5,430  6792 
2030  16,088  45,431  5,365  7050 
Totals  256,000  725,000  89,900  85,300 
 
Scenario 1: Pope et al., 2002, Ed = 0.5, Personal Income Growth = 3%, Discount Rate = 5%. 
Scenario 2: Laden et al., 2006, Ed = 0.5, Personal Income Growth = 3%, Discount Rate = 5%. 
Scenario 3: Pope et al., 2002, Ed = 0.5, Personal Income Growth = 3%, Discount Rate = 5%, SO2 Emissions from 
Power Plants at CAIR cap. 
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Table 2 : Discounting and Total Co-Benefits of Climate Policy ($2006, million)  
 
Year  Total co-benefits, PV. Modeling Scenario 1. 
  2%    3%  5% 
2006  4  4  4 
2007  67  65  63 
2008  127  124  117 
2009  193  186  172 
2010  303  288  262 
2011  1,358  1,280  1,141 
2012  2,390  2,232  1,951 
2013  7,708  7,040  5,895 
2014  12,100  10,944  8,988 
2015  14,152  12,693  10,252 
2016  16,251  14,447  11,465 
2017  18,883  16,640  12,979 
2018  21,217  18,534  14,209 
2019  23,004  19,895  14,955 
2020  24,408  20,911  15,428 
2021  25,184  21,367  15,465 
2022  25,656  21,563  15,319 
2023  26,778  22,294  15,546 
2024  27,797  22,926  15,692 
2025  28,947  23,650  15,890 
2026  30,385  24,585  16,205 
2027  31,206  25,002  16,161 
2028  31,819  25,247  16,011 
2029  33,119  26,014  16,172 
2030  33,902  26,374  16,088 
Totals  437,000  364,000  256,000 
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Table 3: Co-Benefits per ton of GHG Abated ($ 2006), PV 
 
Year  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
2006  0.6  1.6  0.4 
2007  2.2  6.3  0.3 
2008  2.7  7.8  0.3 
2009  2.8  8.9  0.2 
2010  3.2  9.2  0.6 
2011  2.6  7.4  0.5 
2012  2.5  7.1  0.4 
2013  5.3  14.9  2.3 
2014  6.2  16.7  2.8 
2015  5.8  16.2  2.4 
2016  5.8  16.5  2.3 
2017  6.0  16.9  2.3 
2018  6.0  17.0  2.2 
2019  5.9  16.5  2.1 
2020  5.7  16.2  2.0 
2021  5.3  15.1  1.9 
2022  4.9  14.1  1.7 
2023  4.7  13.4  1.6 
2024  4.5  12.8  1.5 
2025  4.3  12.3  1.4 
2026  4.1  11.8  1.3 
2027  3.9  11.1  1.3 
2028  3.7  10.4  1.2 
2029  3.5  10.0  1.2 
2030  3.3  9.4  1.1 
Average  4.2  12.0  1.4 
 
Scenario 1: Pope et al., 2002, Ed = 0.5, Personal Income Growth = 3%, Discount Rate = 5%. 
Scenario 2: Laden et al., 2006, Ed = 0.5, Personal Income Growth = 3%, Discount Rate = 5%. 
Scenario 3: Pope et al., 2002, Ed = 0.5, Personal Income Growth = 3%, Discount Rate = 5%, SO2 Emissions from 
Power Plants at CAIR cap.  
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Table 4: Discounting and Co-Benefits per ton of GHG Abated ($ 2006), PV 
 
Year  Co-Benefits/ton GHG, PV  
Modeling Scenario 1. 
  2%    3%    5%   
2006  0.6  0.6  0.6 
2007  2.3  2.3  2.2 
2008  3.0  2.9  2.7 
2009  3.2  3.1  2.8 
2010  3.7  3.6  3.2 
2011  3.1  2.9  2.6 
2012  3.1  2.9  2.5 
2013  6.9  6.3  5.3 
2014  8.4  7.6  6.2 
2015  8.0  7.2  5.8 
2016  8.3  7.3  5.8 
2017  8.7  7.7  6.0 
2018  9.0  7.9  6.0 
2019  9.1  7.9  5.9 
2020  9.1  7.8  5.7 
2021  8.7  7.4  5.3 
2022  8.3  6.9  4.9 
2023  8.1  6.7  4.7 
2024  8.0  6.6  4.5 
2025  7.9  6.4  4.3 
2026  7.7  6.3  4.1 
2027  7.5  6.0  3.9 
2028  7.3  5.8  3.7 
2029  7.2  5.7  3.5 
2030  7.0  5.5  3.3 
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Table 5: Co-Benefits by Sector and by Pollutant ($ 2006) million, PV 
Modeling Scenario 1. 
 
Pollutant  Transportation  Power Generation 
SO2  4,010  167,000 
PM2.5  7,780  18,000 
PM10  170  1,420 
VOC  15,230  53 
NOx  13,800  21,220 
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Figure 1: Marginal Abatement Costs and Marginal Co-Benefit: Three Modeling Scenarios. 






































Scenario 1: Marginal Co Benefit corresponding to default modeling scenario (Pope et al., 2002, Ed = 0.5, Personal 
Income Growth = 3%, Discount Rate = 5%). 
Scenario 2: Marginal Co Benefit corresponding to scenario 2 (Laden et al., 2006, Ed = 0.5, Personal Income Growth 
= 3%, Discount Rate = 5%). 
Scenario 3: Marginal Co Benefit corresponding to scenario 3 (Pope et al., 2002, Ed = 0.5, Personal Income Growth 
= 3%, Discount Rate = 5%, SO2 Emissions from Power Plants at CAIR cap).  
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Figure 2: Marginal Abatement Costs and Marginal Co Benefits: Discounting. 
 




































Scenario 1: Marginal Co Benefit corresponding to default modeling scenario (Pope et al., 2002, Ed = 0.5, Personal 
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Appendix A: Local Pollution Emission Reductions 
Table A.1: Projected Emission Reductions 
Year  NH3  NOx  PM10  PM2.5  SO2  VOC 
2006  7.22E+01  1.53E+03  1.45E+02  5.60E+01  4.64E+02  5.30E+01 
2007  1.24E+02  4.78E+03  6.75E+02  2.63E+02  9.91E+03  1.03E+02 
2008  1.75E+02  8.03E+03  1.21E+03  4.69E+02  1.93E+04  1.52E+02 
2009  4.68E+02  1.65E+04  2.78E+03  1.08E+03  3.15E+04  3.81E+02 
2010  7.61E+02  2.50E+04  4.36E+03  1.69E+03  4.37E+04  6.09E+02 
2011  5.22E+02  1.32E+05  2.61E+04  7.92E+03  2.17E+05  9.11E+02 
2012  2.84E+02  2.38E+05  4.79E+04  1.41E+04  3.91E+05  1.21E+03 
2013  9.32E+03  5.90E+05  1.43E+05  4.95E+04  8.28E+05  1.27E+05 
2014  1.24E+04  8.41E+05  2.35E+05  7.98E+04  1.26E+06  1.70E+05 
2015  1.59E+04  9.84E+05  2.91E+05  1.00E+05  1.55E+06  2.11E+05 
2016  1.63E+04  1.09E+06  3.46E+05  1.19E+05  1.84E+06  2.15E+05 
2017  1.59E+04  1.27E+06  4.41E+05  1.50E+05  2.23E+06  2.19E+05 
2018  1.54E+04  1.44E+06  5.37E+05  1.82E+05  2.62E+06  2.22E+05 
2019  1.67E+04  1.55E+06  5.89E+05  1.99E+05  2.85E+06  2.26E+05 
2020  1.79E+04  1.66E+06  6.40E+05  2.16E+05  3.07E+06  2.30E+05 
2021  1.93E+04  1.71E+06  6.65E+05  2.25E+05  3.20E+06  2.35E+05 
2022  2.07E+04  1.77E+06  6.90E+05  2.34E+05  3.33E+06  2.39E+05 
2023  2.17E+04  1.85E+06  7.35E+05  2.50E+05  3.52E+06  2.44E+05 
2024  2.28E+04  1.94E+06  7.80E+05  2.66E+05  3.72E+06  2.48E+05 
2025  2.38E+04  2.02E+06  8.33E+05  2.84E+05  3.94E+06  2.53E+05 
2026  2.59E+04  2.10E+06  8.87E+05  3.03E+05  4.16E+06  2.65E+05 
2027  2.87E+04  2.15E+06  9.18E+05  3.14E+05  4.29E+06  2.77E+05 
2028  3.16E+04  2.21E+06  9.48E+05  3.25E+05  4.41E+06  2.90E+05 
2029  3.42E+04  2.26E+06  9.90E+05  3.40E+05  4.57E+06  3.02E+05 
2030  3.67E+04  2.32E+06  1.03E+06  3.55E+05  4.72E+06  3.14E+05 
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Table A.2: Projected CO2 Emission Reductions (million metric tons) 
Year  CO2 
2005  0 
2006  7.488458 
2007  28.45958 
2008  42.80875 
2009  60.64727 
2010  80.83277 
2011  436.894 
2012  779.6579 
2013  1114.222 
2014  1443.999 
2015  1768.925 
2016  1969.037 
2017  2162.47 
2018  2348.985 
2019  2526.462 
2020  2695.084 
2021  2903.342 
2022  3105.232 
2023  3302.92 
2024  3496.121 
2025  3684.403 
2026  3920.703 
2027  4151.93 
2028  4376.768 
2029  4597.892 
2030  4814.992 
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Appendix B:  Overview of EDF Regional Electricity Model Inputs 
 
1. Regional Definition 
 
  The Environmental Defense Fund Regional Electricity Model (EDF REM), provides a 
detailed model of the US electricity sector.  The country is broken down into 8 electrical regions 





    Source: Energy Information Administration 
    (http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str_fuel/html/fig02.html) 
 
 
  The EDF REM does not include Canadian portions of the WECC, MRO and NPCC.  In 
addition, the EDF REM breaks down regions along state lines.  For instance, a small portion of 
Montana is electrically located in the MRO region but in order to bench mark to historical state 




  39 
2. Supply and Demand Curve 
 
The main engine of the EDF REM is the electrical supply and demand curves.  For this study the 
model is run through the year 2030 and each year is broken down into 1,095 8 hour load 
segments.  In each time period, the database of electricity supply units is sorted from least to 
most expensive.  The model "turn on" generating units starting with the least expensive until 
demand is satisfied).  This intersection of supply and demand determines which units operate in 
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2a. Supply Curve 
The starting point for the regional electric supply curve is a database of existing generating units.  
This database was developed using Platts Energy Advantage.  The Platts database supplies 
detailed characteristics on all existing generating units including their location, size in MW, fuel 
type, Heat Rate (HR) in Btu/kWh, emission rates for SO2, NOx, and CO2, and the variable 
operating and maintenance (O&M) cost in $/MWh.  This data is then used to calculate the annual 
operating cost for each generating unit as follows: 
 
                    Var. Cost =   Fuel Price*HR  + Var. O&M + CO2 Rate*CO2 Price +   SO2 
Rate*SO2 Price + NOx Rate*NOx Price 
 
Along with data on existing power plants, the Platts data also provides information about 
announced new capacity.  Each new plant is assigned a probability based on its stage of 
development and the plant capacity is scaled by its probability of completion.  This new planned 
capacity is added to the model according to the projected on line year reported in Platts.  
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Plant emission rates for VOCs, NH3, PM 2.5 and PM 10 are based on the EPA published 
emission factors by plant fuel type and firing type
17. 
 
2b. Demand Curve 
The starting point for the electricity demand curve is the total annual energy demanded in each 
region.  The forecast for the annual energy demand is based on the NERC Report "2008 2017 
Regional and National Peak Demand and Energy Forecasts Bandwidths."  This report details the 
expected demand growth by NERC region.  The total annual demand is broken down into 1,095 
8 hour load blocks in order to  represent the variation in demand across time within a given year.  
The hourly demand curve is developed from the EPA IPM regional load curves: "Appendix 2 1. 
Load Duration Curves used in Base Case 2006".  This curve of 8,760 hours per year is 
aggregated into 8 hour blocks such that block 1 contains the highest 8 demand hours of the year 
and block 1,095 has the 9 lowest demand hours.  These demand blocks are scaled each year to 
reflect the annual demand growth. 
 
 
3. Fuel and Emissions Price Forecasts 
 
Fuel and emission price forecast are derived from a number of differing  sources.   
 
Coal Price 
Platts Energy Advantage provides plant specific coal price forecasts.  The coal price for new 
announced coal plants with a specific site location are tied to the price forecast for the nearest 
existing coal plant.  A weighted average coal price is developed by region for use in new 
economic coal plant additions. 
 
Natural Gas and Oil Price 
The natural gas price forecast is based on the national price forecast used by EPA in their IPM 
modeling.  This national price is broken down into a regional price forecast based on actual 
historical delivered natural gas prices as reported by Platts.  EPA provides a natural gas price 
forecast for both Base Case and Policy Case model runs. 
 
CO2 Price 
The CO2 price forecast is an output of the EDF REM model.  The model starts with an input of 
the desired CO2 emissions over time based on the policy analyzed.  The model runs iteratively in 
order to determine the CO2 price projection consistent with the CO2 emissions targets. 
 
                                                 
17 See http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/efpac/index.html for more information on EPA's emission factors for electric 
generating units.  
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4. New Capacity Additions (economics, characteristics, and types) 
 
The model examines the economic viability of the following types on new generation: nuclear, 
integrated gasification/combined cycle with carbon capture and sequestration (IGCC CCS), 
pulverized coal, gas turbine,  gas combined cycle, wind, and biomass.  The cost and performance 
of new power plants are estimated from EPA data (see EPA Documentation for EPA Base Case 
2006 v3.0), from EIA Table 8.2 Cost and Performance Characteristics of New Central Station 
Electricity Generating Technologies, and from market data for currently planned new generation.  
These data include estimates for the technological improvement in new unit heat rates as well as 
reductions in the costs of building and operating new power plant over time. 
 
New capacity is added in each year based on plant economics.  The model calculates the net 




where: t = time block (1,095 8 hour time blocks per year) 
  Pt = Electricity Market Clearing Price for time block t 
  MC = Marginal Cost for the hypothetical new power plant 
 
The stream of net revenues is discounted back to the date of the capital investment and compared 
versus the required return on investment (ROI).  The ROI varies depending on the type of 
generating plant based on estimates from market information (e.g., a nuclear plant demands a 
higher ROI than a gas combined cycle plant based on the riskiness of the investment). While this 
formulation simplifies the actual operation of generating plants (e.g., it ignores minimum run 
times), it is adequate to gain the basic understanding of the relative economics of the different 
generating technologies needed for the model to make investment decisions.   
 
New build limits for new nuclear, renewables (wind and biomass combined) and CCS plants are 
implemented by applying the limits used by the EPA in the IPM model.   In addition, new 
renewable capacity is schedule to come on line to meet the current state Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS).  This provides a minimum level of renewables to meet current statutes.  
Additional, economic renewables may be added up to the EPA IPM model limits. 
 
5. Model benchmarking to Historical Reported Data 
 
The model benchmarks results for 2005 through 2007 versus actual reported data in order to 
establish proper model operation.  The model is benchmarked versus the following information: 
  EIA Electric Power Annual 2007 - State Data Tables (aggregated by region): 
    Total generating capacity 
    Generating capacity by fuel type 
    Total generation 
    Generation by fuel type 
    CO2, SO2 and NOx emissions 
  EPA eGRID 2005 plant emissions report 








t MC P Max 
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Appendix C:  Allowance prices and input data for transport sector 
modeling  
 
Table C1: Modeled Allowance Prices Under S.2191 ($2005 per tCO2e) 
S.2191 Core Scenario 2  2015  2030  2050 
Adage   $29  $61  $159 
IGEM  $40  $83  $220 
H.R.2454   $13  $26  $69 
   
 
Table C2:  Estimated price indices for petroleum and natural gas under a climate policy 
 
Price Indices             
Petroleum ($/mmbtu)  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030 
BAU  1.00  1.06  1.09  1.11  1.13  1.15 
S. 2191 Scenario 2  1.00  1.05  1.08  1.10  1.09  1.10 
Natural Gas ($/mmbtu)             
BAU  1.00  0.74  0.68  0.71  0.77  0.83 
S. 2191 Scenario 2  1.00  0.74  0.67  0.69  0.73  0.77 
 
ADAGE Core Scenario 2 for the analysis of S. 2191. 
 
 
Table C3: Gasoline price elasticity estimates 
Authors  Year of study  Long-run 
    Low  High 
Nicol  2000       
Brons, Nijkmamp, etc.  2006   .81   .84 
Goodwin Dargay & Hanly  2004   .64   .64 
Espey  1998   .43   .43 
VTPI  2006     
Graham & Glaister  2002   .6   .8 
Small & Van Dender (OLS)  2007   .5695   .5695 
Small & Van Dender (3SLS)  2007   .3813   .3813 
Romero  2007       
HKS  2006       
Mean     .571   .610 










Table C4: Fuel Price Elasticities (Hagler Bailly ,1999) 
  Elasticity 
Road Gasoline   0.60 
Road Diesel   0.30 
Road Propane   0.60 
Road CNG   0.60 
Rail Diesel   0.40 
Aviation    0.30 
Marine Diesel   0.30 
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Figure D.2: Comparison of Cumulative Emissions Ranges under Legislative Climate Change Targets in the 





Source: http://pdf.wri.org/usclimatetargets_2008 12 08.pdf 
 